Equal Opportunity: Federal Employees'
Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort Claims
Kristin Sommers Czubkowskit
INTRODUCTION

For three years, Donald Rochon experienced a systematic
campaign of racial discrimination and harassment from his
coworkers that extended far beyond their mutual workplace. In
addition to being subjected to racially discriminatory stories regarding African Americans told by his coworkers, Rochon had
his competence impugned behind his back, received hate mail
and harassing phone calls, experienced assault and battery, and
bore threats of death, mutilation, castration, and rape, among
other abusive events.'
Had Rochon worked for a private employer, there is little
question that he could recover under a Title VII employment
discrimination claim as well as under several state tort causes of
action. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonexclusivity of Title
VII's remedies for private-sector employees in cases such as Alexander v Gardner-DenverCo2 and Johnson v Railway Express
Agency, Inc.3 In these cases, the Court recognized that "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes," and
that the "clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination."4
However, because Donald Rochon worked for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, one of the first motions against him in
his employment discrimination lawsuit was a motion to dismiss
t BS 2008, University of Wisconsin; JD Candidate 2014, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See Rochon v Federal Bureau of Investigation, 691 F Supp 1548, 1551-52 (DDC
1988).
2
415 US 36 (1974).
3
421 US 454 (1975).
4
Alexander, 415 US at 48-49.
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the tort claims as precluded by Title VII's provisions regarding
discrimination in federal employment.5 The basis for such a distinction is the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v General
Services Administration,6 in which the Court held that a black

employee who filed a Title VII racial discrimination claim twelve
days past the statutory deadline could not instead sue for a violation of his constitutional rights with a 42 USC § 1981 claim.
The Court concluded that Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment."7
While federal employees may, at least in theory, have previously
had the right to sue under the general § 1981 statute for violations of their constitutional rights in the context of employment
discrimination, the Supreme Court ruled that amendments to
Title VII had foreclosed that remedy.
Courts have struggled to apply Brown to cases in which the
legal claims do not overlap as they did in that case. In particular, courts have often responded in different ways to federal employees who bring both Title VII and state tort claims. The main
point of disagreement concerns whether Title VII precludes
state torts under Brown, or whether the torts vindicate rights
that can be considered entirely distinct from Title VII. In
Rochon's case, the court denied the motion to dismiss the tort
claims, holding that Title VII did not preclude such claims to the
extent they were based on his "right to be free from bodily or
emotional injury caused by another person."8 However, the conflict over whether Brown applies to Title VII-tort cases is far
from settled among various federal district and circuit courts,
and cases that present these issues continue to arise.9 Often,
though not exclusively, such cases present facts alleging serious
harms done to the employee. The uncertainty as to what relief, if
any, the employee may be granted is a significant problem. Indeed, the availability of relief may vary across district and circuit courts even though the employees work for the same employer-the federal government-and this presents problems of
Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1555.
425 US 820 (1976).
7
See id at 835.
8
Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1556.
9 See, for example, Charlot v Donley, 2012 WL 3264568, *1-5 (D SC) (presenting a
case in which a federal employee alleged racial discrimination, retaliation, and various
tort claims, including a defamation claim arising from a particular incident that was
presented as factually distinct from the events underlying the discrimination claim).
5
6
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consistency and fairness. Because the federal government is the
nation's largest employer, this issue has the potential to affect
hundreds, if not thousands, of people each year. 0
This Comment reviews the varying approaches and decisions by federal courts over whether and how federal employees
can maintain both state tort claims and Title VII actions stemming from the same or substantially overlapping facts. While a
few courts have held that such claims cannot proceed with a Title VII action when the claims are based on the same set of facts,
most other lower courts have used a grab bag of justifications for
allowing state tort claims to proceed. Such justifications include
that tort law seeks to remedy something legally distinct from
employment discrimination law, that at least some tort claims
are highly personal and thus deserve separate treatment, that
simultaneous Title VII-tort cases that do not indicate an attempt to circumvent Title VII do not fall under Brown, and that
tort actions against individual federal employees do not implicate the sovereign immunity concerns of Brown. This Comment
proposes to resolve that split with a presumption that the state
tort claims can proceed. It reaches this conclusion through a
reexamination of the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act and the implied-repeal doctrine in federal
law."
However, distinguishing torts that do not vindicate substantially separate rights from employment discrimination is also an
important part of the inquiry. Congress chose to amend Title VII
to include a cause of action for federal employees largely based
on its understanding that such employees could not obtain relief
for employment discrimination due to the government's sovereign immunity. Federal employees could sue the government in
tort under the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 (FTCA), however. This
raises important questions about the interplay of each act given
the importance of strictly construing waivers of sovereign immunity. This Comment proposes to distinguish these torts with
a test that assesses whether the tort in question is serving as
the functional equivalent of an employment discrimination
claim. Such an inquiry will add clarity to the existing case law,
10 See Executive Order 13583, 3 CFR 266 (2011) (stating, by executive order, that
the United States is the largest employer and must "lead by example" on issues of diversity in the workplace).
11 See Brown, 425 US at 831-32.
12 Pub L No 79-601, 60 Stat 842 (1946), codified in various sections of Title 28.
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which has unsuccessfully attempted to apply more formalistic
tests to determine whether the tort causes of action vindicate
distinct legal rights. By asking whether the cause of action
serves functionally the same purpose as a Title VII employment
discrimination claim, courts can more clearly balance the congressional goals of providing federal employees with substantially similar remedies as private employees without overextending
the federal government's waivers of sovereign immunity for Title
VII and state torts.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the
Brown case and the legislative history of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972. It also summarizes the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which provides specific conditions and processes for
the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity when
tort claims are brought against government agencies. Part II
surveys lower court cases that have applied Brown to Title VIIstate tort actions brought by federal employees. Part III explains
the proposed solution. First, it discusses the justification for a
presumption that the state tort claims may proceed. Then, it argues that the defendant should be able to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the tort is an end run around Title
VII's procedures and remedies.
I. SECTION 717 AND BROWN V GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION: THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
OF CONGRESS'S DISCRIMINATION REMEDY FOR FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES

This Part provides background information necessary for
understanding the disagreement among courts concerning Title
VII-tort cases involving federal employees described in Part II
and the proposed new hybrid framework described in Part III. It
provides an extensive legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197213 (EEOA), part of which the Supreme Court relied on heavily in its Brown decision and part of
which the Court did not discuss at all. It also summarizes the
Brown decision and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter of
which will be an important consideration in Part III's discussion
of whether the EEOA preempts state tort claims.

13

Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103, codified in various sections of Title 5 and 42.
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A. A Federal Remedy for Federal Employment Discrimination:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was passed
eight years after the monumental Civil Rights Act of 1964,14
primarily to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the ability to judicially enforce the Civil Rights Act.16 However, the EEOA also addressed employment discrimination in
the federal workplace, which had previously been exempted
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.10 This amendment, § 717,

was in response to the perceived inability of federal employees to
obtain redress for employment discrimination under Title VII.17
While the EEOA still technically exempted the federal government from being defined as an "employer," the Act added § 717
to Title VII. Section 717 created a separate, but similar regime
for employment discrimination that allowed federal employees
to file equal employment opportunity complaints with the Civil
Service Commission. If an employee's complaint is not satisfactorily resolved by the Civil Service Commission, she could file an
employment discrimination lawsuit in federal court.18 As in the
rest of Title VII, § 717 made it clear that administrative remedies must be exhausted before filing suit and that there were
strict time limits for those seeking to vindicate their rights in

14 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 2,
28, and 42.
15 See Equal Employment OpportunitiesEnforcement Act of 1971, S Rep No 92-415,
92d Cong, let Sess 1 (1971) (stating the "principal purpose" of the statute "is to amend
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission with a method for enforcing the rights of those workers who have been subjected to unlawful employment practices").
16 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 78 Stat at 253 ("The term 'employer' . . . does
not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the
United States, an Indian tribe, or a State or political subdivision thereof .... .").
17 See Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, S 2515, 92d
Cong, 2d Sess, in 118 Cong Rec 4929 (Feb 22, 1972) (statement of Senator Alan
Cranston) ("My Federal Government EEO amendment included in the committee bill

would ....

[flor the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government

in discrimination cases.").
18

EEOA

§717,

86 Stat at 111-12. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-

sion replaced the Civil Service Commission as the body in charge of handling federal
employment discrimination claims in 1978. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, Pub
L No 95-633, 92 Stat 3781 (1978).
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court.' The statute also applied several procedural aspects from
other sections of Title VII to federal employee suits wholesale.20
The Supreme Court in Brown considered congressional
statements regarding the necessity of an amendment to Title
VII to be the most significant portions of the EEOA's legislative
history, discussing them at length in the opinion.21 Employment
discrimination by the federal government had been considered
illegal under the Fifth Amendment for many years. 22 However,
members of Congress acknowledged that federal employees were
unable to pursue their claims in courts due to sovereign immunity, which barred suits against the United States to which the
government did not consent. 23 Among other parts of the legislative history, the Court quoted heavily from the Senate Report on
the EEOA, which stated, "an aggrieved Federal employee does
not have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must
overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or
failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as
to the steps required to exhaust such remedies."24 Thus, in order
for the federal government to be "a model of equal employment
opportunity," Congress had to waive its sovereign immunity
through legislation, which is what § 717 explicitly did.25
However, unlike the statements regarding sovereign immunity that played a prominent role in the opinion, the Brown
Court did not take note of several statements from members of
19 EEOA § 717(c), 86 Stat at 112.
20 EEOA § 717(d), 86 Stat at 112. Because § 717 is included within Title VII and
involves substantially similar remedies to traditional Title VII suits, the terms are often
used interchangeably in this Comment. A claim filed under § 717 may be called a Title
VII claim, for example.
21 See Brown, 425 US at 825-29.
22 See S Rep No 92-415 at 12 (cited in note 15).
23 See id at 16:
The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee
found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts.
In many cases, the employee must overcome a U.S. Government defense of
sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies.
24 Brown, 425 US at 828-29, quoting S Rep No 92-415 at 16 (cited in note 15).
25 118 Cong Rec at 4929 (remarks of Senator Alan Cranston) (cited in note 17). See
also Brown, 425 US at 829. Waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed by
courts in favor of the government, which likely complicated the Supreme Court's analysis
in Brown of whether § 717 precluded other remedies for employment discrimination. See
United States v Idaho, 508 US 1, 6-7 (1993) ("There is no doubt that waivers of federal
sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally expressed' in the statutory text... . 'Any
such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States."').
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Congress regarding the type of discrimination they had in mind
in creating the legislation and how they felt the amendment related to the portions of Title VII applying to private employees.
These statements play an important role in determining the
scope of § 717's exclusivity in Part III.
Both the House and Senate committee reports on the bill
noted the importance of the amendment for adding moral authority to the federal government's regulation of private businesses under Title VII. The House report stated:
The Federal service is an area where equal employment opportunity is of paramount significance. Americans rely upon
the maxim, "government of the people," and traditionally
measure the quality of their democracy by the opportunity
they have to participate in governmental processes. It is
therefore imperative that equal opportunity be the touchstone of the Federal system. 26
The Senate Report similarly addressed the symbolic need for the
bill, stating: "The Federal government, with 2.6 million employees, is the single largest employer in the Nation. . . . Conse-

quently, its policies, actions, and programs strongly influence
the activities of all other enterprises, organizations and groups.
In no area is government action more important than in the area of civil rights."27
Several members of the House and Senate also spoke individually on the issue of § 717 during hearings on the EEOA.
These congressmen and congresswomen consistently emphasized the need to provide similar remedies for federal employees
and private employees who experience discrimination. Senator
Alan Cranston, who authored § 717, stated that the amendment
would, "[flor the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the
Federal Government in discrimination cases."28 He compared the
amendments related to federal employees to those previously
provided to private employees: "Subsection (c) of the new section
717 creates a remedy in Federal district court-comparable to
private employment actions-for any employee who has exhausted the equal employment opportunity complaint procedure within
26 Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, HR Rep No 92-238,
92d Congress, 1st Sess 22 (1971).
27 S Rep No 92-415 at 12 (cited in note 15).
28 118 Cong Rec at 4929 (cited in note 17).
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his Federal agency."29 That view was affirmed by Senator Harri-

son A. Williams, chairman of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, who stated:
Previously, there have been unrealistically high barriers
which prevented or discouraged a Federal employee from
taking a case to court. This will no longer be the case. There
is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the
same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the
private sector, and I believe that the committee has acted
wisely in this regard.30
Significantly, in the committee reports, members of Congress consistently spoke of a particular type of employment discrimination. Namely, the legislation was specifically designed to
address the federal government's failure to hire minorities and
women and to advance them proportionately. While it is unlikely that Congress did not intend to include more extreme examples of discrimination in federal employment within the scope of
the Act, its focus was on systemic discrimination and its effects.
There was little discussion regarding the more vivid, individualized examples of discrimination, as is frequently seen in the cases this Comment discusses.
The legislative history is replete with discussion of systemic
concerns. The committee reports of both houses of Congress and
the remarks of Representative Carl Perkins, chairman of the
Committee on Education and Labor, describe the underrepresentation of minorities and women in federal employment, particularly at higher pay grades.31 Other legislators who spoke
specifically of the overall failure to hire and promote women and
minorities in reference to § 717 include: Representative Herman
Badillo,2 Representative Patsy Mink,33 and Delegate Walter

29 Id at 4921 (emphasis added).
30 Id at 4922 (emphasis added).
31 See HR Rep No 92-238 at 23 (cited in note 26); S Rep No 92-415 at 13-14 (cited
in note 15); Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971, H Res 542, 92d
Congress, 1st Session, in 117 Cong Rec 31960 (Sep 15, 1971) (statement of Representative Perkins) (recounting evidence of the exclusion of women and minorities).
32 See 117 Cong Rec at 32101-03 (cited in note 31) (statement of Representative
Badillo) (describing the underrepresentation of Spanish-speaking employees in the federal service).
33 See id at 32105 (statement of Representative Mink) (describing discrimination
against women in federal employment).
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Fauntroy.34 When extreme examples of discrimination were
mentioned, it was to distinguish them from the cases motivating
the proposed legislation. Specifically, the House Report and
Senate Report criticized the federal Civil Service Commission for
focusing on cases in which there was "malicious intent," rather
than looking at systemic discrimination in federal employment.3 5
As will be discussed later, that legislators were focused on systemic discrimination in creating § 717 and appeared to believe
that more extreme examples of discrimination were already being addressed by the Civil Service Commission to at least some
degree is relevant to the issue of whether Title VII preempts
state tort actions.
B.

A Sovereign Immunity Wrinkle: The Federal Tort Claims
Act

Federal employees with simultaneous tort and employment
discrimination claims frequently sue only the federal government, not individual employees. Therefore, the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the federal government's partial waiver of sovereign
immunity for tort claims, is also relevant to the issue of concurrent tort and employment discrimination claims. The Act,
passed in 1946, provides another set of procedural and substantive limitations for federal employees who wish to sue on discrimination and tort claims. Specifically, anyone seeking to assert a tort claim against the government must first file an
administrative complaint with the requisite agency.36 If the
agency denies the claim in writing or fails to respond within six
34 See id at 32094. Delegate Fauntroy, an African American pastor who represented
the District of Columbia for twenty years as a nonvoting member of Congress, eloquently
stated the problem that federal employees, many of whom were his constituents, faced:

My father was employed at the U.S. Patent Office here for 44 years before retiring. He knew the effects of discrimination and we, his children, knew his
frustration and despair. He trained two generations of white employees who
were then passed up and over the shoulder to higher level and higher paying
jobs. From all the evidence I have seen, even today in this supposedly enlightened time, these practices continue daily with little substantive change.
35 HR Rep No 92-238 at 24 (cited in note 26) ("The Civil Service Commission seems
to assume that employment discrimination is primarily a problem of malicious intent on
the part of individuals. It apparently has not recognized that the general rules and procedures it has promulgated may actually operate to the disadvantage of minorities and
women in systemic fashion."); S Rep No 92-415 at 14 (cited in note 15) (making the same
point).
36
28 USC §2675(a).
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months, the complainant may then file a tort suit.31 To prevail
on a tort claim against the federal government, the employee
who committed the tort against the plaintiff must have been acting within the scope of his employment.38 If a claim is filed
against the United States, the federal employee who committed
the tort cannot also be sued individually.39 Moreover, punitive
damages and interest on the judgment are unavailable and attorney's fees are limited.40
Lastly, there are several circumstances under which recovery from the United States is barred. These include when the
employee-tortfeasor performed discretionary actions with due
care, 41 as well as when an employee allegedly committed "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."42 Thus, while the
FTCA provides important context regarding the federal government's waivers of sovereign immunity for torts, it is important
to note that for many of the torts at issue in this Comment, employees may be sued only as individuals and only if they are acting outside the scope of their duty. In these cases, there is no
sovereign immunity question at all, provoking a separate analysis of § 717's potential exclusivity. There are, however, some additional protections for federal employees sued individually for
tort claims based on absolute or qualified immunity for federal
officials.43
C. The Supreme Court Takes On § 717 Exclusivity: Brown v
General Services Administration
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v General Services

Administration provides the current framework for the exclusivity of Title VII. The Court relied on part of the EEOA's legislative history, the structure of § 717, and general canons of statutory
37 28 USC § 2675(a).
38 28 USC § 2675(a).
39 28 USC § 2676.
40 28 USC §§ 2674, 2678.
41 28 USC § 2680(a).
42 28 USC §2680(h).
43 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 806-07 (1982) (noting that legislators acting in their legislative capacity, judges acting in their judicial capacity, and select executive officers have absolute immunity, but that most executive officers will have qualified
immunity based on the level of discretion in their activities).
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construction to reach its conclusion. In the case, the plaintiff,
Clarence Brown, was an African American employee of the defendant agency who had been passed up for promotions in favor
of white men on two different occasions. He filed a complaint of
racial discrimination with the agency's equal employment office
and the office responded that they did not believe race played a
role in the promotions.44 Brown then requested and received a
hearing before the Civil Service Commission. The body reached
the same conclusion and notified Brown that he had thirty days
to file a suit in district court. 45 Brown sued in district court fortytwo days later, making claims under Title VII, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.46 The district
court dismissed the claims and the circuit court affirmed because the thirty-day statutory deadline for Title VII claims had
elapsed and Title VII precluded the other claims.47
The Supreme Court in Brown was thus presented with the
question of whether Title VII provided the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination for federal employees. Prior to the
case, the Court had held that Title VII was not the exclusive
remedy for private employees in Alexander v Gardner-Denver
Co48 and Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc.49 However, un-

like in Brown, which focused exclusively on the EEOA, both earlier cases addressed the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which created the original Title VII. Alexander cited
the legislative goals of "[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance,"
legislators' decision to include multiple fora to adjudicate Title
VII claims, and the "congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes" to hold that a plaintiff
did not forfeit his Title VII claim by pursuing a discrimination
remedy under a collectively bargained arbitration process.50 In
Johnson, the Court pointed to the same congressional intent, citing Alexander, but also to specific congressional statements regarding the continued availability of § 1981 as a remedy for private employees to "augment" Title VII to conclude that the
44 Brown, 425 US at 822.

45 Id at 822-23.
Id at 823.
Brown v General Services Administration, 507 F2d 1300, 1307-08 (2d Cir 1974).
48 415 US 36 (1974).
49 421 US 454 (1975).
50 Alexander, 415 US at 44-48.
46

47
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statute of limitations on a § 1981 claim did not toll during a Title VII claim.51
In Brown, however, the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act played no such role; rather, the Court focused exclusively on the history of the EEOA, which added § 717 to provide
the benefits of Title VII to federal employees. The Court first
commented: "[T]he question is easier to state than it is to resolve. Congress simply failed explicitly to describe § 717's position in the constellation of antidiscrimination law. We must,
therefore, infer congressional intent in less obvious ways."52 The

Court relied on legislative history-specifically statements as to
why there had previously been no remedy for federal employees-and the structure of the EEOA to conclude that Brown's
other claims were barred. The Court explained that while injunctive relief was possible, courts had largely held that sovereign immunity barred monetary remedies against the federal
government for employment discrimination.68 The Court noted
that the legislative history of the Act also strongly indicated that
legislators believed sovereign immunity barred such suits before
the EEOA. Whether or not Congress's understanding of the law
was correct, the Court relied on this understanding to determine
Congress's intent to waive sovereign immunity.54
The Court then examined the structure of the Act, which
contains "complementary administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms."5> The Act includes several prerequisites for
obtaining judicial relief, such as requiring plaintiffs to seek administrative relief first, a thirty-day limit to file claims, and carryover provisions from Title VII governing "venue, the appointment of attorneys, attorneys' fees, and the scope of relief."6 The
51 Johnson, 421 US at 459.
52 Brown, 425 US at 825.
53 See id at 826.
54 See id at 828 ("[Tlhe relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived
the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was.").
Given the similarity of § 717 to the remedies provided to private employees and the
statements of several members of Congress regarding the scope of § 717 discussed in
Part IA, it is perhaps questionable that the purposes of the Civil Rights Act were not
considered in Brown. However, as seen in the discussion accompanying this note, the
Court appeared to consider the fact that § 1981 was not considered applicable to federal
employees prior to the EEOA as dispositive of whether it remained inapplicable afterwards, and did not consider whether Congress sought to make that remedy available to
federal employees via its inclusion under Title VII.
5s Id at 831.
56 Brown, 425 US at 832.
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Court reasoned that this structure demonstrates that § 717 of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act was meant to be the
"exclusive remedy" for employment discrimination for federal
employees.65 The Court noted that "[t]he balance, completeness,
and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c)
was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial
relief."58

In Brown, the Court rejected Brown's reliance on Johnson
for the idea that § 1981 was available to federal employees, reasoning that Johnson was "inapposite" due to legislators' belief,
as evinced in the EEOA legislative history, that there had been
no proper remedies for federal employees before § 717.59 In other
words, that private employees had other claims for which they
could seek remedies in addition to Title VII had no bearing on
the fact that federal employees did not have such remedies prior
to the EEOA.60 Lastly, the Court relied upon a canon of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general to conclude
that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general
remedies."61 Specifically, the more-detailed § 717 preempted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provided the more general § 1981
remedy for discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts. 62
Given the desire expressed by legislators to put federal employees on equal footing with private employees, the holding in
Brown is questionable. Nevertheless, the most relevant feature
of Brown for the purposes of this Comment is that the case did
not deal with state tort causes of action. The statutes in question
were federal civil rights statutes and did not address the type of
infringements addressed by the cases described in Part II,
namely harms to a federal employee that would constitute torts
even in the absence of an employment relationship. In particular, the Supreme Court in Brown did not need to consider if the
type of discrimination Brown claimed to have suffered was contemplated by Congress when it passed the EEOA; being passed
57
58

See id at 831-32.
Id at 832.

59 Id at 833.
60
61

See Brown, 425 US at 833-34.
Id at 834.

62 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27, codified as amended at 42 USC
seq.

§ 1981 et
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over for employment opportunities is a .classic example of employment discrimination contemplated by members of Congress
in their comments about the Act.63 As will soon be evident, the
process of reconciling Brown with state tort claims, particularly
in the shadow of the Federal Tort Claims Act, has been far from
predictable.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CASE LAW AFTER BROWN

Brown's declaration that Title VII is the exclusive remedy
for discrimination in federal employment has left courts sharply
divided on the question of whether § 717 precludes state tort
claims from being litigated simultaneously with Title VII discrimination claims. Essentially, the question for courts is
whether the torts in question aim to remedy employment discrimination or some other distinct legal right. This question can
become complicated depending on the nature of the tort in question and other factors. Even when courts agree that such claims
should be allowed, the reasoning is often disparate. After several
decades, the result is a muddied, divided landscape in which
some federal employees' tort claims can proceed (although rarely
under the same test) and others' cannot. Thus, the success of
such claims often depends on the court in which the cases are
filed. Even within districts and states, the standards judges apply can vary. This Part explores and categorizes those decisions.
A.

Cases That Have Allowed Simultaneous Tort and Title VII
Claims
1. The distinct-legal-right/highly-personal-wrong
exception.

The most common, although somewhat ill-defined exception
to Brown is the distinct-legal-right exception. In such cases,
courts have allowed simultaneous claims when they determine
that a plaintiff has suffered a harm separate from discrimination-that is, when the associated tort claim involves legal
rights distinct from the right to be free from discrimination.
Generally, though not exclusively, courts have also indicated
63 See 117 Cong Rec at 31960 (cited in note 17) (statement of Representative Perkins) (describing the purpose of § 717 as being to remedy the failure to hire and promote
women and minorities at sufficient rates).
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that in addition to involving separate rights, the torts must involve a "highly personal wrong[ ]"to the plaintiff to be allowed to
proceed.64 A common thread running through many of these cases, either explicitly or implicitly, is the question of whether the
tort in question is sufficiently distinct from the type of employment discrimination Congress had in mind when it passed

§ 717.65

One of the first cases to deal with potential distinctions between tort and discrimination claims for federal employees was
Stewart v Thomas,66 which (ironically) involved an employment
discrimination claim made by an employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).67 The plaintiff sued
the Commission for sex discrimination and the individual offending employee for assault, battery, outrage, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.68 The District Court for the District of Columbia distinguished the case from Brown on the basis
that Stewart sought to vindicate "two distinct and independent
rights: her right to be free from discriminatory treatment at her
jobsite and her right to be free from bodily or emotional injury
caused by another person."69 The court noted the inadequacy of
an employment discrimination claim to remedy bodily harm
and, to some extent, emotional injury due to the "highly personal" nature of such harms, which the court described as "beyond
the meaning of 'discrimination."'70 Rather, the court concluded
that the employment discrimination and tort remedies may both
be required, the former to cure the harms to society and the latter to cure the physical and emotional harms of an individual.71
In relying on the notion of "distinct and independent rights,"
Stewart is one of the first examples of the distinct-legal-right exception to Brown.72 Stewart remains one of the most frequently
cited cases in this context.73
Brock v United States, 64 F3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir 1995) (quotation marks omitted).
See, for example, Gerentinev United States, 2001 WL 876831, *7 (SDNY).
66 538 F Supp 891 (DDC 1982).
67 Id at 893.
68 See id.
69 Id at 895.
70 See Stewart, 538 F Supp at 896.
71 See id at 897.
72 Id at 895.
73 As of October 2013, a Westlaw search lists sixty case citations to Stewart. Several cases rely on Stewart's reasoning wholesale. One such case is Otto v Heckler, 781 F2d
754 (9th Cir 1986), a sexual harassment case involving claims of assault, invasion of
64

65
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Shortly after Stewart, the same district court articulated
another, potentially stronger statement of the distinct-legalright standard in Rochon v Federal Bureau of Investigation.74
The court extensively discussed Brown, and rejected the defendants' assertion that Brown precluded Rochon's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct, invasion of privacy, assault and battery, and other torts. "Brown
stands for the proposition that Title VII preempts other remedies for discrimination in federal employment only when the
federal employee is challenging action directly and singularly related to discrimination in the terms and conditions of his or her
employment."76 The court analyzed several cases in which Title
VII was held not to be preemptive, dividing them into three categories: (1) tort claims that vindicated rights that Title VII could
not remedy, (2) additional legal claims that were based on different facts than the Title VII claim, and (3) tort claims that
provided remedies for harms that went over and above discrimination.76 Ultimately, the court held that only a distinct legal
right need be present; the same facts or a harm greater than
discrimination were not required for a plaintiffs claim to
proceed.77
Brunetti v Rubin78 provided a similarly strong statement
against § 717's preclusive effect based on a reevaluation of the
Act's legislative history. Brunetti involved sexual harassment
claims by an employee of the Internal Revenue Service, who also
claimed that her employer engaged in "extreme and outrageous

privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, with plaintiff alleging that the sexual harassment ultimately contributed to a miscarriage.
74 691 F Supp 1548 (DDC 1988). The disturbing facts of this racial discrimination
case were stated in this Comment's Introduction.
75 Id at 1555.
76 See id at 1556.
77 Id. The District Court for the District of Columbia took up the issue again in
Boyd v O'Neill and appeared to give plaintiffs the option of proving that there was a distinct legal right or a highly personal wrong at issue. See Boyd v O'Neill, 273 F Supp 2d
92, 96 (DDC 2003). It is thus unclear after this case whether a supplemental tort claim
must be merely different from the Title VII discrimination claim, or both different and
more personal than discrimination to go forward. Intriguingly, the defendants also argued that Stewart should be ignored because Title VII was amended to provide for compensatory and punitive damages. The court rejected the defendants' "double recovery"
argument because "each [cause of action] seeks to remedy a different wrong." Boyd, 273
F Supp 2d at 96-97.
78 999 F Supp 1408 (D Colo 1998).
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conduct."7 The court, looking at the same legislative history as
that analyzed by the Supreme Court in Brown, stated: "Nothing
in that history [ ] suggests that Congress intended to prevent
federal employees from suing their employers or supervisors for
constitutional, statutory, or common law violations against
which Title VII provides no protection at all."80 Thus, the court
in Brunetti determined that Brown stands for the proposition
that the preclusive effect of § 717 is limited to employment discrimination and nothing more. Citing Stewart, the court held
that "to the extent [a federal employee's] emotional injuries were
a direct result" of a supervisor's tortious behavior and not a result of the work environment, a claim against the supervisor
could proceed.81
While cases such as Rochon and Brunetti suggest that distinct legal rights being affected need not be further qualified to
obtain tort relief, the Ninth Circuit again underscored the need
for a "highly personal wrong[ ]" in Brock v United States82 in its
analysis of whether tort claims could proceed with a Title VII
claim. In Brock, a female Forest Service employee claimed that
her direct supervisor sexually harassed and raped her.83 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the FTCA claim against the United
States could proceed because the plaintiff suffered a "highly personal wrong[ ]" as a result of the government's negligent supervision of her superior. Notably, the plaintiffs harasser continued
to work in the same agency for months after the rape, and the
plaintiff was harassed by other coworkers after she requested
and received a transfer to another department.84 This variant of
the distinct-legal-right rationale justified the potential additional compensation that the plaintiff could receive because the
plaintiff was subject to a wrong that was not just distinct from,
but more harmful than discrimination.86

79
80

81
82

Id at 1409.
Id at 1412.

Id at 1411.
64 F3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir 1995) (quotation marks omitted).
83 See id at 1422. Note the previous discussion of assault and battery being unavailable in an FTCA tort claim. See Part I.B.
84 See Brock, 64 F3d at 1423.
85
See id. The same employee had filed an EEOC complaint for sex-based discrimination based on the same events, which was settled out of court before the plaintiff
brought the tort claim, raising the possibility of the plaintiff receiving compensation beyond what Title VII contemplated.
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The Brock court invoked a greater-includes-the-lesser argument to conclude that the sexual assault was both potentially
tortious and de facto discrimination and that the "ultimate
harm" of rape goes beyond the "lesser offense" of discrimination.86 This distinction has been frequently cited despite its

meaning and boundaries being unclear on the surface and rarely
explained by courts.87 The Brock court also noted that not allowing simultaneous tort and Title VII suits under these circumstances would "contravene the basic purposes of Title VII" by
preventing employees assaulted based on gender from suing under the FTCA, but allowing those employees assaulted for reasons other than their gender to seek such a remedy.88 Without
explicitly going into the legislative history of § 717, the court
concluded that such a result could not possibly be within Congress's intent.89

Jones v Perry9o demonstrates the potential confusion in using the language of both distinct legal rights and highly personal
wrongs to determine whether tort claims can proceed. There, the
plaintiff sued the Defense Contract Audit Agency for sexual
harassment under Title VII and her supervisor for assault and
battery based on the same events.9 ' The court noted that whether a tort claim could go forward depended on "the extent that Title VII fails to capture the personal nature of the injury done to
the plaintiff as an individual."92 The court indicated, however,
that such claims may not go forward if they "arise from the type
of employment discrimination contemplated by Title VII.">' According to the court in Jones, then, an exception to Brown requires that the injury be personal as well as unrelated to Congress's conception of discrimination to be remedied in tort. Such
an explanation of the standard differs from Brock's and Stewart's uses of highly personal wrongs and distinct legal rights by
requiring an analysis not just of modern conceptions of what
statutes seek to remedy, but an analysis of what Congress at the
time of § 717 understood itself to be addressing.
86

87
88

89
90
91
92

3

Brock, 64 F3d at 1423.
See id at 1422.
Id at 1423-24.
Id.
941 F Supp 584 (D Md 1996).
See id at 585.
Id at 586, citing Stewart, 538 F Supp at 897.
Jones, 941 F Supp at 586.
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One of the biggest concerns with the distinct-legal-right and
highly-personal-wrong standards is that the contours of such
standards are difficult to readily define. Because the courts in
many of these cases only face the potential dismissal of a tort
claim under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard, which is relatively lenient for plaintiffs, they have not often
had to decide precisely when a highly personal violation or distinct legal right has been implicated, only whether there is a
reasonable possibility of one. In Wallace v Henderson,94 however,
the court did make such a determination. In Wallace, the plaintiff was a witness to sexual harassment who complied with an
EEOC investigation.95 As a result, he suffered retaliation that
included stalking and threats to his body, life, and employment. 96 The plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII and his
coworkers who engaged in the retaliation for intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking punitive damages.*9 The court
relied on the Stewart, Brock, and Brunetti decisions to hold that
"a federal employee who has brought a Title VII claim is not
precluded from suing for a 'highly personal violation' that goes
beyond discrimination."98 The court held that a separate legal
right was apparent from the facts of the case, which included not
only retaliatory behavior outside the workplace, but also "particular threats and conduct" that made the plaintiff too "afraid
to leave his apartment" and caused his "heart condition [to
worsen]."9 The latter determination is reminiscent of the facts
historically necessary to prove the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, namely, that the plaintiffs distress be accompanied by physical effects.100 Thus, Wallace implies that the

likelihood of the tort claim's success or the presence of a tangible
physical injury may strengthen a claim that a highly personal
wrong or distinct legal right has been implicated.

94

95
96
97
98
99
100

138 F Supp 2d 980 (SD Ohio 2000).
See id at 981.
See id.
See id at 982.
Wallace, 138 F Supp 2d at 984.
Idat 986.
See Lynch v Knight, 11 Eng Rep 854, 863 (HL 1861) (Wensleydale).
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2. Cases that emphasize Title VII's procedural and
remedial limitations.
The concern that a plaintiff might be attempting to circumvent Title VII's procedural and remedial limitations to obtain an
easier or greater recovery is pervasive in cases addressing Title
VII-tort claims. The procedural concern tends to arise in cases
using the distinct-legal-right or highly-personal-wrong standard,
despite its somewhat uneasy fit with such substantive discussions of legal rights and personal wrongs.101 Some courts have
focused on whether a plaintiff followed Title VII's procedural requirements as a proxy for assessing the merits of a particular
claim. These courts have even gone so far as to use such behavior to determine whether the claim involves a distinct legal
right. The court in Stewart, for example, noted favorably that
the plaintiff had not tried to circumvent the administrative remedies of Title VII, but rather had exhausted her remedies under
Title VII and sought additional relief.102 The court further alluded to the plaintiffs intentions by stating that Stewart "does not
ask this court to stretch 'marginally applicable statutory, common law, and constitutional theories of individual recovery' to
her situation.103 Thus, based in part on procedural issues, the
court felt comfortable in stating that Stewart was not attempting to elide Title VII's procedural or remedial limitations, but
rather address separate harms with separate remedies.
As in Stewart, Baird v Haith1o4 relied heavily on a plaintiffs

possible intent to circumvent Title VII's many procedural requirements. The plaintiff alleged religious discrimination based
on her refusal to work Saturdays and sued under Title VII and
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.os Citing Stewart,

the court determined that Title VII did not preempt "causes of
action which, while arising from the same set of facts, are

101 The concern over circumventing Title VII comes not just from the statute's procedural requirements, but also because Title VII limits remedies for employment discrimination, which prompts concerns about overrecovery as well as procedural evasion.
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, codified as amended in
various sections of Titles 2 and 42 (allowing compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination, but limiting the amount available).
102 See Stewart, 538 F Supp at 896.
103 See id at 895, quoting Neely v Blumenthal, 458 F Supp 945, 952 (DDC 1978).
104 724 F Supp 367 (D Md 1988).
105 See id at 369-70.
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completely distinct from discrimination."106 To determine whether such a cause of action is actually distinct, the court examined
the plaintiffs complaint "to determine if she is attempting to bypass the administrative and remedies restrictions of Title VII 'by
the simple expedient of putting a different label on the pleadings."'107 The court did not describe how its test could be admin-

istered; the court simply observed that all of the plaintiffs emotional distress complaints stemmed from occurrences in her
workplace.108

3. The officiallunofficial activity exception.
Many courts have recognized an exception to the Brown

framework when, instead of suing the federal government, a
plaintiff sues another federal employee based on his actions toward the plaintiff outside the scope of the employee's official duties. While there is some overlap with the distinct-legal-right exception in these cases, it is worth discussing them separately.
Suing an individual employee, if correctly done, does not implicate any of the sovereign immunity issues that complicated the
court's decision in Brown, and so these types of cases may be set

aside when discussing the preemptive scope of Title VII. These
cases are important to discuss, however, because such a determination is necessary before applying a more complex solution.
In Wood v United States,109 the court held that Brown did

not apply when a federal employee sued another employee individually because there was no sovereign immunity issue.110 In

Wood, a US Army employee attempted to sue her supervisor for
assault and battery related to his sexual harassment of her,
which had culminated in her dismissal.111 The plaintiffs ability
to sue the major individually was particularly important because the federal government has not waived immunity for assaults and batteries of its employees under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.112 In Wood, the federal government attempted to

substitute itself for the defendant under the FTCA-arguing
that the employee was acting within the scope of his duty-and
106 Id at 373.
107 Id at 373-74,

quoting Brown, 425 US at 833.

108 See Baird, 724 F Supp at 376.
109 760 F Supp 952 (D Mass 1991).
110 See id at 956.
111 See id at 953-54.
112 See 28 USC § 2680(h).
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then have the suit dismissed because of the FTCA exception for
assault and battery. The court, however, concluded that the behaviors alleged were not in the scope of employment under the
required test, which involved applying the relevant state's law of
respondeat superior.113 Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs
claim against her supervisor could continue on an individual basis and that Brown did not preclude tort suits against individual
federal employees.114
Several of the cases mentioned above also discussed the relevance of the plaintiff suing an individual federal employee
based on his unofficial acts as opposed to suing the government
based on respondeat superior. In Baird, the court dismissed the
individual defendants' argument that sovereign immunity
barred the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
claim.115 The court noted that the FTCA provided a potential

waiver of sovereign immunity, but stated that the plaintiff did
not follow the required procedure because she sued the defendants in their official capacities instead of the United States.116 In
Boyd v O'Neill,117 the court granted the defendant's motion to
substitute the United States for the defendant, applying the law
of the District of Columbia regarding what constitutes "the scope
of employment."11s The court determined that the defendant's alleged assaults occurred while discussing employment issues
with the plaintiff, satisfying the requirement that conduct be
"incidental to the conduct authorized."'1 Thus, the defendant's
actions were within the scope of employment.120
Lastly, consideration of employees as individuals played a
significant role in Rochon, in which the court dismissed claims
against some of the officers for their failure to investigate the
113 See Wood, 760 F Supp at 955. Note that this means that even if a court agreed
with the premise that the assault and battery involved a legal right that could be vindicated separate from discrimination, if the offending employee was determined to have
been acting within the scope of his employment, there may be no remedy for the plaintiff.
114 See id at 956-57.
115 See Baird, 724 F Supp at 376.
116 See id at 376-77.
117 273 F Supp 2d 92 (DDC 2003).
118 Id at 97.

119 Id at 98-101.
120 See id. It may be worth noting the breadth of the District of DC standard compared to the District of Massachusetts standard; the wide variety of jurisdictional standards for respondeat superior is outside the scope of this Comment, but nonetheless poses
interesting questions regarding the varying ability for plaintiffs to sue federal employees
for torts as individuals.
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plaintiffs racial discrimination claims. The court determined
that these officers' (lack of) action was subject to absolute immunity because their actions were not "manifestly or palpably
beyond [their] authority" and were discretionary in nature.121
The court dismissed the claims even though the officers in question were accused of not only failing to investigate, but of "participating in, condoning, or covering up various acts of racial
harassment" in the course of their supervisory activities.122
4. Cases that recognize exceptions exist, but do not apply
them.
In addition to cases that create and apply the distinct-legalright and highly-personal-wrong exceptions, several other courts
have acknowledged that those exceptions exist, but have proved
unwilling to apply those exceptions. Some courts have distinguished between cases where the tort claim is substantiated by
a separate set of facts and those where the tort claim is "wholly
derivative"123 of the employment claim.124 In Roland v Potter,125 a
United States Postal Service employee sued her employer under
Title VII, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation when she
was demoted for selling cosmetics at work, as well as for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.126 The court
acknowledged that since Brown, "courts have strived to delimit
the preemptive effect of Title VII over various state law claims,"
such as those that remedy wrongs other than workplace discrimination.127 However, the court noted that "[t]here is not a clear
cut answer [ ] as to whether a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress caused by discriminatory conduct seeks a different remedy than a Title VII claim."128 The court in Roland de-

termined that separate facts did not support the IIED claim and

121 Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1561, citing Martin v District of Columbia Police Department, 812 F2d 1425, 1429 (DC Cir 1987).
122 Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1562.
123 Roland v Potter,366 F Supp 2d 1233, 1236 (SD Ga 2005).
124 This has occurred despite the fact that courts applying the distinct-legal-right
standard in many earlier cases have denied, either implicitly or explicitly, the need for a
separate set of facts. See, for example, Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1556. See also Part II.A.
125 366 F Supp 2d 1233 (SD Ga 2005).
126 See id at 1233-34.
127 Id at 1235.
128 Id.
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that the claim was therefore "wholly derivative" from the Title
VII claim and thus preempted.129
In an opinion that blurs the distinct-legal-right exception
and the individual-employee exception discussed above, the
court in Gerentine v United States3o employed a standard of
"traditional workplace behavior"'3' to determine whether a tort
suit could proceed. There, the plaintiff sued the US Army for
gender discrimination and retaliation and her individual supervisors for defamation and IIED stemming from alleged sexual
harassment and retaliation.132 The court noted that the plaintiff
did not follow Title VII procedure for the defamation- or IIEDrelated claims. It determined that she was trying to use tort law
to get around the procedural requirement.133 The court acknowledged, however, that "[n]otwithstanding Title VII's broad
preemptive scope, some courts have held that a tort claim will
lie against a federal employer, including an individual supervisor, if the supervisor's actions exceed conduct that constitutes
traditional workplace behavior."13 To test for such behavior, the
court asked if the behavior in question was the type of workplace discrimination contemplated by Title VII. The court decided that Gerentine's complaints fell into that category and thus
could not also qualify as a tort. 35 However, it is unclear whether
"traditional workplace behavior" refers to the determination
that the behavior was highly personal or involved a legal right
distinct from discrimination, or whether the employee was acting outside the scope of his employment and could thus be sued
individually.
Lastly, judicial criticism of the vagueness of the contours of
the highly-personal-wrong standard arose in the Ninth Circuit
case Sommatino v United States.136 The majority concluded that
tort claims could not proceed in a Title VII case because the
wrongs were not "of the order of magnitude of the personal violation of rape in Brock, the forced sexual assaults in Arnold [v
United States] (forced kissing, fondling, and blocking the door),
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See Roland, 366 F Supp 2d at 1235-36.
2001 WL 876831 (SDNY).
Id at *7.
Id at *1.
Id at *7.
Gerentine, 2001 WL 876831 at *7.
See id.
255 F3d 704 (9th Cir 2001).
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and the following and phone calling at home -in Otto."131 Judge
Stephen Reinhardt addressed the potential problems in applying
the court's highly personal standard in a partial dissent. Judge
Reinhardt detailed the allegations of Sommatino that her
coworker repeatedly and intentionally brushed his arms against
her breasts and "restrained" her in conversations outside of the
office, noting that he did "not believe that the majority opinion
establishe[d] a principled line between conduct that gives rise to
an FTCA claim and conduct that does not."138 Judge Reinhardt
instead proposed that any conduct meeting the standard of an
assault should suffice for FTCA purposes. 39 Judge Reinhardt's
criticisms of the highly-personal-wrong standard are prescient;
it is unclear whether his proposed standard could be seen as a
version of the distinct-legal-rights standard, or whether he
would view determining whether a tort is sufficiently distinct
from employment discrimination to pose similar problems, but
such a broad standard as his has yet to be adopted by any court.
B.

Cases That Have Not Allowed Simultaneous Tort and Title
VII Claims

A number of courts have held that tort claims cannot be
pursued simultaneously with Title VII claims. Looking more
closely at each case, however, one may question whether the
courts could have achieved the same result more narrowly, either by concluding that a plaintiff was attempting to bypass Title VII by converting employment discrimination claims into tort
claims, or by determining that the tort claims were meritless.
One of the earliest cases to deny plaintiffs the ability to sue
on both tort and Title VII causes of action was DiPompo v West
Point Military Academy,140 in which the plaintiff argued that the
academy discriminated against him on the basis of his learning
disability by requiring passage of several tests for employment
as a firefighter.141 In DiPompo, the court relied on Brown to
137 Id at 712.
138

Id at 713.

139 See id. Note, however, that assault is one of the exceptions for which the gov-

ernment cannot be held liable under the FTCA. The case does not state the specific tort
the plaintiff alleged, but it is possible that the plaintiff alleged a negligent supervision
tort similar to the one used in Brock.
140 708 F Supp 540 (SDNY 1989).
141 See id at 542. Note that disability discrimination was covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq, at the
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dismiss the plaintiffs statutory and IIED claims. The court noted the Supreme Court's concern that the administrative requirements of Title VII would be ignored if other, less procedurally rigorous causes of action were allowed.142 The court
dismissed the tort claims against individual defendants, stating:
"DiPompo merely takes the allegations of employment discrimination, allocates them among the individual defendants, and
sees in the result . . . the intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress."148 The dismissal of the tort claim is so curt that it is plausible that the judge considered the tort claim to be meritless, independent of its preemption by Title VII.
Pfau v Reedl44 provides one of the clearest, if flawed, tests to
determine whether a federal employee's tort claim can proceed.
In short, the court held that plaintiffs could not file simultaneous Title VII-tort suits arising from the same set of facts.145 In
that case, the plaintiff sued the Defense Contract Audit Agency
for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII after
she was allegedly sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, who she claimed made "lewd and suggestive comments,"
"request[ed] sexually provocative behavior from" her, retaliated
against her when she refused, and eventually terminated her.146
Pfau sued the supervisor individually for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in addition to pursuing a Title VII cause of
action. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the IIED claim, citing Brown's preemptive effect as the "exclusive" remedy for federal employment discrimination: "We have
interpreted the Supreme Court's mandate in Brown to mean
that, when a complainant against a federal employer relies on
the same facts to establish a Title VII claim and a non-Title VII
claim, the non-Title VII claim is 'not sufficiently distinct to
avoid' preemption."'14
time, and is now covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101336, 104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq. However, the statutes parallel Title
VII in their employment discrimination language, and courts frequently interpret such
acts in tandem with Title VII holdings, as evidenced in this case. See DiPompo, 708 F
Supp at 544-45.
142 See DiPompo, 708 F Supp at 544 (stating that "DiPompo seeks to do precisely
what Brown prohibits").
143 Id at 547.
144 125 F3d 927 (5th Cir 1997), vacd and remd on other grounds 525 US 801 (1998).
145 See Pfau, 125 F3d at 932.
146 Id at 930-31.
147 Id at 932, quoting Rowe v Sullivan, 927 F2d 186, 189 (5th Cir 1992).
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.The court rejected all of Pfau's attempts to distinguish her
case from Brown. Her arguments included: (1) that an IIED
claim requires that a plaintiff prove different legal elements
than a sexual harassment claim, (2) that the purposes of the two
laws are distinct, (3) that different facts supported each claim,
and (4) that her claim was valid under the Federal Tort Claims
Act and could therefore not be preempted.148 The court concluded
that the preemptive scope of Brown largely outweighed any other argument. Because the tort claim was for a more general
remedy and all of the facts of the case could support the Title
VII claim, there was nothing to distinguish the tort claim.149 The
court also held that Title VII was preemptive as to suits against
individual federal employees as well as departments or agencies,
going further than any other court in that regard.150 Significantly, however, the judge's evaluation of the merits of the Title VII
claims also appeared to play a role; the Fifth Circuit rejected the
discrimination claims based on a narrow interpretation of an
employer's responsibility to know about and remedy sex discrimination by its employee.11 That position was repudiated by the
Supreme Court, which summarily remanded the case to be adjudicated consistently with its previous opinions.152
In Mathis v Henderson,153 the Eighth Circuit followed Pfau's
same-set-of-facts test, holding that the same facts could be used
to prove employment discrimination or tortious conduct, but not
both.164 There, the plaintiff, a former United States Postal Service employee, sued her supervisor under Title VII for sexual
harassment and retaliation, as well as under several state law
claims, including "loss of consortium."5 The district court held
that some of the supervisor's behavior was outside the scope of
his employment and that Title VII did not preclude the claims
against the plaintiffs supervisor as an individual. The lower
court's conclusion resembles the cases mentioned above that

148

See Pfau, 125 F3d at 932.

149 See id at 933-34.

150
151
152
153
154
155

See id at 934.
See id at 938-41.
See Pfau, 525 US at 801.
243 F3d 446 (8th Cir 2001).
Id at 449-51.
Id at 447.
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determine if a state tort claim can proceed based on the employee's official or unofficial behavior.156
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed that Title VII precluded the tort claims against the United States based on the supervisor's activity that fell within the scope of his official employment. 57 The court then evaluated the preclusive effect of Title
VII for the supervisor's behavior that was outside his scope of
employment.16 The court determined that, as long as the plaintiff intended to use that behavior as part of her Title VII claim
against the government, she was unable to sue the defendant
individually: "[Elither supervisor Dick's extracurricular conduct
was part of a pattern of employment discrimination, that is,
sexual harassment, within the meaning of Title VII, which then
is her sole remedy, or it was the individual tortious action of
Dick for which he is personally responsible."169 In other words,
the court concluded that the same facts could not be used to
support claims of discrimination and other torts, even when the
defendants were different; the preclusive effect of § 717 eclipsed
any suits against individuals based on the same incidents.160

This comprehensive overview of combined Title VII-tort
suits demonstrates that courts have not settled on a single test
or framework to apply when confronted with such cases. Each of
the current approaches is flawed in its own way. The distinctlegal-right approach relies on formalistic determinations of
which laws vindicate which rights and forces courts to assess
See Part II.A.3.
Mathis, 243 F3d at 449.
158 Id at 450.
156
157

159 Id at 451.
160 A few additional courts have concluded that § 717 has a similarly preclusive effect, but have gone into less detail in their reasoning. In Mannion v Attorney General,
2000 WL 1610761 (D Conn), the court relied on Brown's conclusion that the "'balance,
completeness and structural integrity' of Title VII" made it "the exclusive remedy for
federal employees complaining of discrimination." Id at *2, quoting Brown, 425 US at
832. While the court acknowledged that state tort claims were allowed in private employer Title VII suits, the court suggested that its hands were tied by Brown with regard
to federal employees. See Mannion, 2000 WL 1610761 at *2. In Lewis v Snow, 2003 WL
22077457 (SDNY), the district court cited Mannion to conclude that the plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was precluded by his Title VII claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, but also brought up familiar concerns that plaintiffs might attempt to evade the procedural requirements of Title VII. Lewis, 2003 WL
22077457 at *11-12.
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fine-grained arguments about the rights in question. It is possible to imagine a court distinguishing any tort from employment
discrimination merely because two separate causes of action exist. Similarly, the highly-personal-wrong standard is overly
broad in that employment discrimination is also often highly
personal in character. Thus, it does not provide a useful distinction between torts and employment discrimination claims. Analyses that focus on whether a plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements of Title VII are unreliable because they
focus entirely on the behavior of a plaintiff rather than on legal
distinctions. Whether a plaintiff is suing an individual or the
federal government is a similarly incomplete distinction, as a
determination that the individual may be sued does not answer
any of the sovereign immunity questions that arise in suing the
federal government. And, decisions that categorically exclude
tort claims brought in conjunction with Title VII claims misunderstand the law, as many other areas of law do not require separate factual allegations to vindicate rights under multiple
causes of action. Thus, a different approach to explaining this
type of case is required.
III.

A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF PERMITTING TITLE VII-ToRT
SUITS BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

As should be apparent, combined Title VII-tort suits present a host of complex, often-intertwined issues. It is not surprising that courts have resolved these issues in divergent ways.
This Comment provides a framework for thinking about these
hybrid cases in a way that stays true to Brown but is not unduly
constrained by its holding, which did not consider state tort law
at all. In particular, this Comment argues that there should be a
presumption that the employee can sue on a state tort claim, but
the presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the state tort
is serving as the functional equivalent of an employment discrimination claim. The presumption in favor of allowing the tort
suits to proceed is supported not only by extensive legislative
history regarding the purpose and focus of the EEOA, but also
by Supreme Court doctrine regarding implied repeals of federal
law.
However, Congress's belief that employment discrimination
actions by federal employees had previously been barred by sovereign immunity mitigates this presumption to some degree.
The Court relied on this aspect of legislative history in Brown to
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hold that employment discrimination claims by federal employees are limited solely to § 717, and any approach to Title VIItort cases must consider whether the tort is serving any purpose
other than remedying employment discrimination. To do so,
judges should consider whether the tort in question serves as
the functional equivalent of a Title VII employment discrimination claim.
The functional-equivalent test shares much in common with
courts' previous attempts to provide a distinct-legal-right test,
but addresses the extent to which Brown precludes tort claims
in a functional, rather than formalistic, manner that draws on
the preemption of state law doctrine. This functional approach
better captures what the Court in Brown aimed to eliminate,
namely, allowing another cause of action to serve as an end run
around a Title VII claim. This approach also better allows courts
to consider the intent of plaintiffs who are pursuing tort remedies. Rather than using procedural evasion as a proxy for the
merits of a claim, courts using the functional-equivalent test can
explicitly consider whether the plaintiff could have filed a Title
VII claim and chose not to, or other indicators that the plaintiff
is using a tort claim as the equivalent of a Title VII claim.
A.

Creating a Presumption in Favor of Permitting State Tort
Claims

Given the holding in Brown, it may seem strange to argue
that there should be a presumption in favor of allowing state
tort claims to proceed in a federal employee's Title VII case. The
Brown court emphatically denied the plaintiff a § 1981 remedy,
holding that § 717 provides the "exclusive judicial remedy for
claims of discrimination in federal employment."161 However,

there are two significant factors that differentiate the Court's
holding in Brown from Title VII-tort cases discussed in this
Comment. First, because the Congress was focused on systemic
discrimination when it passed § 717, rather than the maliciousintent discrimination that most frequently results in additional
tort claims, the Brown Court's reasoning is less persuasive for
most of the state law torts involved in these cases. Second, the
Supreme Court's doctrine of implied repeal of federal statutes,
which was implicitly at issue in Brown's analysis of Title VII's
161 Brown, 425 US at 835.
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preemption of § 1981,162 counsels a different conclusion in the
area of state torts given the federal government's explicit waiver
of sovereign immunity for torts in the FTCA.163
As recounted in Part I.A, § 717 was added to Title VII to
solve the problem of systemic discrimination in federal employment. 164 Statements in the committee reports, as well as comments by Representatives Perkins, Badillo, and Mink and Delegate Fauntroy, indicate that Congress was most concerned with
federal employment and advancement of minorities and women. 165 Thus, to the extent that Congress intended § 717 to be an
exclusive remedy, it is incongruous to think that it intended for
that remedy to reach situations such as those in Brock and
Rochon, in which federal employees were sexually assaulted and
openly threatened by their fellow employees.166 Indeed, the
committee reports make clear that such actions motivated by
malicious intent were not the primary reason for adding § 717,
potentially because there were existing legal or administrative
remedies for such acts before the Civil Service Commission or in
tort. 167

Secondly, different conclusions about Title VII's exclusivity
arise in applying the Supreme Court's doctrine of implied repeal
to Brown and to cases involving state torts. The Supreme Court

162 42 USC § 1981(a) (forbidding racial discrimination in the right to "make and enforce contracts," which has been interpreted to include employment relationships).
163 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court received a fair amount of criticism after its decision in Brown, but none of that criticism addressed the effect of the decision
on cases where state tort claims are brought with Title VII claims. Rather, the focus has
been on what Brown means for the preclusive effect of Title VII with respect to other
general federal civil rights statutes, such as § 1983 and § 1981. See Michele W. Homsey,
Employment Discriminationin the Public Sector: The Implied Repeal of Section 1983 by
Title VII, 15 Labor L 509, 522 (2000) (describing the Brown decision as confusing in the
wake of Johnson and concluding that artful pleading to circumvent Title VII was permissible); Nancy Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 by Title VII: An UnwarrantedDeprivation of Remedies, 15 Hofstra L Rev 265, 266 (1987) (arguing that preemption of § 1983
often leaves plaintiffs without a remedy at all for discrimination if they are unable to
navigate the procedural complexity of Title VII); Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983
Claims to Redress Discriminationin Public Employment: Are They Preempted by Title
VII?, 35 Am U L Rev 93, 108 (1985) (calling the court's conclusion about the preemptive
scope of Title VII as "at best, a nonsequitor").
164 See HR Rep No 92-238 at 24 (cited in note 26); S Rep No 92-415 at 14 (cited in
note 15).
165 117 Cong Rec at 32101-03, 32105-06, 32094 (cited in note 31).
166 See Brock, 64 F3d at 1422; Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1551-52.
167 See HR Rep No 92-238 at 24 (cited in note 26); S Rep No 92-415 at 14 (cited in
note 15).
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provides a detailed description of its implied-repeal analysis in
Posadasv National City Bank:168

Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect
should be given to both if possible. There are two wellsettled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later
act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.
But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal
must be clear and manifest.169
It is not immediately apparent that the Brown Court believed
that it was engaging in an implied-repeal analysis with regard
to the general § 1981 statute and § 717 of Title VII; whether
§ 717 repealed part of § 1981 was never explicitly presented as
an issue in the case. However, a main component of the doctrine
of implied repeal involves the Court avoiding repeal by implication whenever possible by reading potentially conflicting statutes in a way that allows both statutes to coexist.70 This type of
avoidance of the implied-repeal question did take place in
Brown, albeit somewhat implicitly. The Court relied on statements by members of Congress that there was no remedy for
discrimination in federal employment to conclude that § 1981
did not provide a remedy for federal employment discrimination.
Thus, there was nothing for § 717 to preclude.171 The Court
therefore appeared to view Brown's suit as an attempt to argue
for the first time that the relatively general § 1981 civil rights
statute should serve as a remedy for discrimination in federal
employment, despite the availability of Title VII.
168 296 US 497 (1936).
169 Id at 503.

170 See Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 273-74 (2003).
171 See Brown, 425 US at 828:

The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was persuaded
that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy. And the case law suggests that that conclusion was entirely reasonable. Whether that understanding of Congress was in some ultimate sense
incorrect is not what is important in determining the legislative intent in
amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover federal employees. For the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the
law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was.
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On the surface, this statutory interpretation is something
more akin to the canon of construction that the specific governs
the general. However, given that both statutes involve the issue
of civil rights, the analysis can also be seen as a precursor to an
implied-repeal analysis; the Court was giving effect to statutes
"upon the same subject"172 by concluding that § 1981 did not apply to the federal government, while § 717 did. Thus, despite not
mentioning implied repeal explicitly, the Brown analysis comports with the Supreme Court's implied-repeal jurisprudence.
Had the Court not chosen to avoid the implied-repeal question,
Brown's holding would have been much more difficult to reach.
Concluding that § 717 impliedly repealed § 1981 as a remedy for
federal employees would have been nearly impossible given the
very strong presumption against implied repeals and the need

for clear indications of congressional intent to repeal earlier
statutes. By contrast, the EEOA featured statements by members of Congress that federal employees should have similar
remedies to private employees, who could simultaneously sue
under § 1981 and Title VII.17 If anything, the legislative history
included more statements against an implied repeal than in favor of it.

The Court in Brown avoided the question of a potential implied repeal by determining that § 1981 does not apply to the
federal government because of sovereign immunity, in that
sense giving effect to both statutes by confining § 1981 to private
parties and § 717 to federal government employees.174 This
avoidance conclusion, however, does not fit cleanly with the
FTCA, which includes a comprehensive waiver of sovereign immunity and remedial scheme for torts committed by federal employees.175 In addition to the FTCA arguably not being on the
same subject as the EEOA, unlike § 1981, the FTCA provides an
explicit waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity
for many state law torts. 176 Thus, there is little room for the Supreme Court to sidestep the implied-repeal question by concluding that such tort remedies could not previously stand against
the federal government.
172

National City Bank, 425 US at 503.

173 See id ("The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored."). See
also notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
174 See Brown, 425 US at 828.

176 See 28 USC §§ 2671-80.

176 See Part I.B.
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If the Court faced an implied-repeal analysis of the FTCA
and EEOA head-on, it is difficult to imagine the Court concluding that even a partial repeal of the FTCA took place. Even if it
could be argued that the FTCA and EEOA are on the same subject, the question then becomes the following: Are the FTCA
provisions waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity
for torts in "irreconcilable conflict"177 with § 717, or does § 717
"cover the whole subject" of the FTCA? The answer to both questions is almost certainly no. The FTCA is aimed at a wider variety of federal employee actions than § 717 aims to cover, including most unintentional torts, and it is apparent that § 717
cannot "cover the whole subject" of the FTCA. It is similarly difficult to see where an "irreconcilable conflict" between the statutes might lie. The legislative history indicates that Congress
was focused on systemic, likely nontortious employment discrimination in passing § 717. Members of Congress went so far as to
contrast such practices with so-called malicious-intent discrimination, which implicates tortious behavior.178 This focus on invidious discrimination may have been important because federal
employees who suffered torts committed by their colleagues had
some form of remedy, either through administrative remedies or
tort claims themselves.17 The most logical way to read § 717 and
the FTCA, then, is that § 717 covers employment discrimination
by federal employees that does not rise to the level of a tort, and
that the FTCA continues to provide relief for torts committed by
federal employees. The extent to which the statutes may still interact is discussed in Part III.B.
Lastly, it is worth noting again here that when tort lawsuits
are filed against individuals, as they often are in these cases,
there is no sovereign immunity issue at all.180 Coupled with the
statements of several politicians in the legislative history of the
EEOA regarding the need for uniform remedies for federal and
177

National City Bank, 425 US at 503.

See 28 USC §§ 2671-79. See also Part I.A. It may be relevant to note that one of
the Supreme Court's most significant implied-repeal cases involves the same act as this
Comment, the EEOA. In Morton v Mancari, 417 US 535 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that § 717 of the EEOA did not implicitly repeal the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act, Pub L No 73-383, ch 576, 48 Stat 984 (1934), codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq,
that stated a preference for American Indians to be employed at the federal Bureau of
Indian Affairs. See Mancari,417 US at 546-48.
179 Note that such tort claims could proceed under the FTCA, if the tort in question
was not excepted from the statute or against a federal employee as an individual.
1so See Part II.A.3.
178
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private employees, the lack of a sovereign immunity problem
suggests that federal employees should be individually liable in
tort the same way private employees can be liable to their colleagues.181 Immunity doctrine would continue to protect federal
employees by providing them with official immunity for actions
within the scope of their employment, but reading § 717 to protect them further would potentially not provide sufficient disincentives for federal employees to engage in tortious and discriminatory behavior.182
Thus, there are strong arguments that support a presumption in favor of allowing tort claims against the federal government and federal employees as individuals to proceed in Title
VII-tort suits. The legislative history indicates that tortious
employee conduct was not the focus of § 717, but rather that the
statute aimed at providing a remedy for more systemic discrimination in federal employment, which had been explicitly excluded from the original Title VII. Moreover, the doctrine of implied
repeals of federal law permitted the Brown Court to read § 717
and § 1981 in a way that they did not conflict by applying one
specifically to the federal government and one to nonfederal actors. Such an avoidance reading is not similarly available with
the FTCA. The FTCA explicitly waives the federal government's
immunity for a wide variety of torts, and thus cannot be read
not to apply to federal actors. Given the limited scope of § 717 in
applying to employment discrimination and the lack of congressional statements that the amendment applied to tortious behavior, § 717 could not likely be read to have impliedly repealed
the FTCA as it applies to federal actors who commit torts
against fellow federal employees. Thus, in Title VII-tort suits
against the federal government, there should be a strong presumption that such suits may proceed.
B.

Barring State Tort Claims That Are the Functional
Equivalent of Title VII Claims

While there are many justifications for a strong presumption in favor of allowing a tort claim to proceed with a Title VII
181
182

See 118 Cong Rec at 4921-22 (cited in note 17).
See Daniel A. Morris, Federal Employees' Liability since the Federal Employees

Liability Reform & Tort CompensationAct of 1988 (the Westfall Act), 25 Creighton L Rev
73, 100-01 (1991) (noting the possibility that an employee could still claim individual
immunity for intentional torts for which the government has not waived immunity).
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claim, there remains the question of when, if ever, that presumption may be rebutted. This Comment proposes that the
presumption in favor of allowing tort claims to proceed against
the government should be rebuttable when the tort in question
is the functional equivalent of an employment discrimination
claim. The term "functional equivalent" indicates that the plaintiff is using a tort to remedy employment discrimination as understood and interpreted under Title VII.
Allowing the presumption to be rebuttable under these circumstances is important given the emphasis the Brown Court
placed on congressional statements regarding the lack of remedies for discrimination in federal employment due to sovereign
immunity. Specifically, the Court concluded that Congress added § 717 to Title VII because it believed that there was no other
remedy available to employees suffering from employment discrimination, particularly systemic discrimination.183 The Supreme Court in Brown held Congress to those statements regarding the lack of previous remedies in holding that § 717 was thus
the exclusive remedy for discrimination in federal employment.
The crucial part in this next step of the analysis, then, is determining when a tort is functioning in the same manner as Title VII does. Given the statements in the legislative history regarding systemic rather than malicious discrimination, this
universe of torts is potentially narrow. The lack of employment
discrimination remedies for federal employees prior to § 717
does not mean that tort remedies were not available for extreme
cases; the federal government could be sued in tort via the FTCA
prior to Title VII and the EEOA, and individual federal employees who were acting outside the scope of their employment could
also be sued in tort. In a substantial number of cases, then, the
facts of the case will legitimately point to both tort and Title VII
claims.184
183 See Brown, 425 US at 828-29, citing 118 Cong Rec at 4929 (cited in note 17)
(statement of Senator Alan Cranston) ("My Federal Government EEO amendment included in the committee bill would . .. . [flor the first time, permit Federal employees to
sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases.").
184 Given the intent of Congress to provide a remedy where there previously was
none and the frequent allusions in the legislative history to systemic employment discrimination rather than malicious-intent discrimination, there is a fair argument that
§ 717 should not apply when there is a valid tort remedy under the FTCA, particularly if
that remedy existed prior to the passage of § 717. However, such an interpretation would
result in an impermissibly confusing statutory scheme. Plaintiffs would have to search
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Multiple factors are important in considering whether a tort
is the functional equivalent of an employment discrimination
claim. Perhaps most obviously, a tort claim is likely not the
functional equivalent of an employment discrimination claim
when the plaintiff provides evidence of tortious acts committed
outside of the workplace. Under such an inquiry, cases like
Rochon and Wallace provide the clearest examples of what
would thus not be a functional equivalent; the tortious behavior
of the employees extended beyond the workplace, making it difficult to argue that the torts in question served as the functional
equivalent of employment discrimination and nothing more. 85
Secondly, for statutory torts or torts that have been developed and refined in state courts, the state's description of the
right and cause of action, including evidence of legislative history regarding what the state was seeking to remedy and the elements a plaintiff must prove, will be relevant. Such an inquiry
will focus on whether the state legislature or courts intended the
tort to remedy employment discrimination. Lastly, a court may
make a contextual inquiry as to whether the employee appears
to have a prima facie case of employment discrimination under
Title VII and has procedurally defaulted on it or is seeking damages in excess of Title VII's limits, implying that the use of a
state tort may be an end run around Title VII. Such procedural
concerns were a major factor in Brown, and it is appropriate to
consider them in tort cases, as well.186 None of the above factors
will be dispositive, and courts may determine that other factors
are equally or more important, but the named factors provide a
starting point for analysis as to how a particular tort is functioning.
The guiding principles of the Supreme Court's preemption
doctrine may provide another helpful lens for considering any
rebuttal arguments made by the federal government. The Supreme Court has articulated a presumption against finding federal preemption of state law, but this presumption is not nearly
as strong as the implied-repeal doctrine for federal law.187
for all possible tort remedies before pursuing a Title VII claim under § 717, and failure to
come across an existing remedy would pose a trap for the unwary.
1s5 See Rochon, 691 F Supp at 1551-52; Wallace, 138 F Supp 2d at 981-82 (describing the facts of each case).
186 See Brown, 425 US at 832-33.
187 See Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption against Implied
Repeals, 92 Cal L Rev 487, 520 (2004) ("The Court clearly finds preemptive conflict less
objectionable than implied-repeal conflict.").
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Rather than interpreting state law to avoid conflict whenever
there is no clear assertion that Congress intended to repeal it, as
is generally done for federal laws,188 the Court considers whether
there is actual conflict between state and federal law, whether
the state law is an obstacle to Congress's intent in creating the
federal law, or whether the federal statutory scheme is so complete as to leave no room for state law to operate. 89 However,
the Court has added, "The ultimate question in each case, as we
have framed the inquiry, is one of Congress's intent, as revealed
by the text, structure, purposes, and subject matter of the statutes involved."1so
As has now been discussed at length, the Brown Court relied explicitly on Congress's intent to waive sovereign immunity
for employment discrimination coupled with "[tihe balance,
completeness, and structural integrity" of § 717 to conclude that
it was an exclusive remedy for employment discrimination and
that civil rights statutes like § 1981 were unavailable for federal
employees.191 Using that interpretation of the legislative history,
it seems logical that the Court would similarly hold that state
torts seeking to remedy employment discrimination are precluded.192

However, it is important to note that Congress's understanding of employment discrimination at the time of the EEOA
did not completely intersect with modern conceptions of Title
VII. Specifically, while the Supreme Court had established a test
for disparate impact, or systemic discrimination, by 1971 in
Griggs v Duke Power Co,193 thus recognizing unintentional
188
189

See Branch, 538 US at 273, quoting National City Bank, 296 US at 503.
See Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 545 (1992).

190 Id.
191 Brown, 425 US at 832.
192 This statement implies that a state has created a tort for remedying discrimination, but oftentimes, plaintiffs apply existing common law torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, to a situation that would otherwise appear to fit wholly into
Title VII. Recalling the legislative history of the EEOA, there is an important distinction
between systemic discrimination and malicious-intent discrimination for those pursuing
torts. In the former, the issue is that the tort being applied only seems to remedy employment discrimination, whereas in the latter, the tort applies to something discrete
that happened in the context of a larger employment discrimination episode. The functional-equivalent test aims to distinguish when an individual is seeking a tort remedy
for what is generally considered systemic employment discrimination, such as failure to
hire and failure to promote based on protected status.
193 401 US 424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that a plaintiff did not need to prove discriminatory intent when a neutral employment practice had a disparate impact on a protected class of employees).
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discrimination prior to passage of the EEOA,194 the Supreme
Court did not hold that sexual harassment constituted employment discrimination until 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v

Vinson.19 In Meritor Savings Bank, the Court formalized the
EEOC's definition of sexual harassment and confirmed that Title VII addressed not only economic injury due to discrimination,
but also the psychological effects of a hostile work environment
from severe or pervasive harassment.196 Sexual harassment is
thus by nearly all accounts a latecomer to modern understandings of Title VII, and it is unlikely that either Congress or the
Supreme Court in Brown considered the application of § 717 to
such cases.191
The relatively late recognition that Title VII remedied psychological as well as economic harms from discrimination, particularly in the form of sexual harassment claims, partially explains the difficulty that arises in considering the tort claims
that frequently arise out of sexual harassment cases, including
assault, battery, IIED, and negligent supervision.198 While courts
have previously attempted to distinguish many of such cases on
the basis of distinct legal rights and highly personal wrongs, the
fit of such standard has been awkward at best, as Title VII is at
least partially able to account for the personal nature of sexual
harassment in its remedies. Given the modern understanding of
sexual harassment as employment discrimination and of discrimination including some psychological harm, the functionalequivalent test generally counsels against permitting torts such
as IIED and negligent supervision to proceed against the government along with Title VII claims in such cases.199
194 Griggs was revolutionary in its holding that discriminatory intent need not be
present for a successful Title VII claim. See id. The statements by members of Congress
in the EEOA legislative history that discrimination could be systemic or maliciously motivated thus confirmed that the Griggs holding applied to Title VII, but do not bear
strongly on the issue of malicious-intent discrimination, which was always assumed to
be included in Title VII.
195 477 US 57, 64-65 (1986).
196 See id.
197 See, for example, Victoria T. Bartels, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Supreme Court's Recognition of the Hostile Environment in Sexual Harassment Claims, 20
Akron L Rev 575, 576 (1987) (recounting the history of sexual harassment claims and
noting they were frequently dismissed as being personal rather than employment related
prior to Meritor Savings Bank, 477 US 57).
198 See, for example, Stewart, 538 F Supp at 893.
199 Were assault and battery claims permissible against the federal government under the FTCA, a difficult line-drawing problem might arise as to what level of assault or
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The Court in Meritor Savings Bank established that sexual
harassment must be so severe or pervasive as to affect the conditions of one's employment in order to be actionable under Title
VII, and soon after, Congress again amended Title VII to provide
for compensatory and punitive damages.200 Thus, in the context
of sexual harassment, Title VII appears to apply to many incidents of repugnant employee behavior that might individually
be considered tortious. Absent particularly extreme circumstances, however, the government's liability in sexual harassment cases should be restricted to what is available under Title
VII.201 To the extent that the employee was acting outside of the
scope of his duty and could be sued individually, the holding in
Brown does not require that tort remedies be precluded.
Consider Brock, in which the plaintiff was raped by another
federal employee, and later pursued a claim of negligent supervision against the government, and Sommatino, in which a
plaintiff who had been sexually harassed and touched inappropriately by a supervisor filed a similar claim.202 A negligent supervision claim generally imposes liability on an employer for
failing to properly supervise an employee, an issue that is at the
heart of many, if not most, employment discrimination cases and
thus should be viewed skeptically.203 Negligent supervision is
distinct from employment discrimination as a cause of action in
that it depends on an employee committing a separately actionable tort. But, in the examples of Title VII-tort cases where the
federal government may be held liable, courts must also consider
battery is understood to be part of sexual harassment and what part exceeds it, but that
is not a question that the FTCA in its current form introduces. It is also worth noting
that IIED suits have generally been filed against individual employees, and thus may
not necessarily pose the sovereign immunity issue of Brown.
200 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 105 Stat at 1072, codified at 42 USC § 1981a
(permitting limited compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination).
201 Congress is, of course, free to amend Title VII in the shadow of Brown and the
development of sexual harassment doctrine to provide more liability for the federal government to its own employees. Absent such a statement, however, Brown requires that
§ 717 be the exclusive liability for the federal government for employment discrimination, which now includes sexual harassment claims.
202 For an interesting analysis of the interplay between the negligent supervision
tort and the assault and battery exception of the FTCA, see Jack W. Massey, Note, A
Proposalto Narrow the Assault and Battery Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 82
Tex L Rev 1621, 1624 (2004) (proposing that the assault and battery exception be narrowed, but that negligent supervision torts be held to a higher standard).
203 See Brock, 64 F3d at 1422.
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not only whether the employee's actions may constitute a tort,
but also whether they fall within what is commonly understood
as employment discrimination or sexual harassment, which has
been held to include relatively severe circumstances.204
Thus, a court must look to the underlying employee action
to determine what the employer failed to supervise, and in the
case of the federal government's liability, consider whether the
underlying tort action is the functional equivalent of an employment discrimination or sexual harassment claim.205 Had the
negligent supervision claim in Brock been based solely on the
plaintiffs sexual harassment allegations and not included the
rape claims, the opposite result from what the Ninth Circuit
reached in Brock would occur, and indeed recovery against the
government in Sommatino would be similarly limited. Sexual
harassment is not a separate tort,206 so the employer's liability
would derive exclusively from Title VII rather than tort law. It
is not clear that a negligent supervision tort would not proceed
under circumstances such as those described in Sommatino under the distinct-legal-right test-is the right in question the
right to be free from an employer's negligence? If so, there is the
potential to artificially distinguish a tort from almost any Title
VII claim; the functional-equivalent test fares much better in
determining whether the negligent supervision tort is doing any
additional work.
Another challenging issue for the functional-equivalent test
exists in the many cases of intentional- infliction of emotional
distress. IIED claims relate to a plaintiffs emotional and physical harm stemming from a particular underlying action; determining whether the emotional harm stems from a tortious action or a discriminatory action can be difficult.207 Consider the
DiPompo case, in which the plaintiff was rejected for a firefighter position due to his inability to pass the required tests because
of a learning disability.208 The entire basis for the IIED claim

was the rejection of an employment relationship; no other
Id at 1425.
Id.
206 Id at 1423-24.
207 It is worth noting here that the majority of IIED claims are filed against individuals and would not necessarily pose an issue for the federal government's liability. For
the purposes of discussion, however, these examples are being considered from the perspective of the government being liable for IIED.
208 See DiPompo, 708 F Supp at 542-43.
204
205
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behavior by the defendants was mentioned.209 Thus, any claim
by the plaintiff was based on potential employment discrimination, not a separate tort. Similarly, although the court in Pfau
correctly rejected the plaintiffs IED claim, it did so based on
the problematic same-set-of-facts test. The functional-equivalent
test is a better fit for deciding this case; while the same set of
facts may allow two causes of action (such as a tort and a criminal law violation), it is apparent from the case that the plaintiffs IED claim stemmed from a fairly typical case of sexual
harassment, not any otherwise-tortious behavior. Sexual harassment typically causes emotional distress, but the Supreme
Court has held Title VII to include recovery for emotional
harms. For this reason, Pfau's IED claim would be the functional equivalent of another employment discrimination claim.
CONCLUSION
Employment discrimination law is an area in which cases
are numerous and factual distinctions are crucial. This makes
any attempt to fit a large number of Title VII-tort cases into a
comprehensive framework challenging. Nonetheless, this Comment has attempted to not only categorize previous cases involving federal employees, but also offer a different lens by which to
analyze future cases. By providing a basic presumption to guide
judicial management of these cases, this Comment aims to clarify the post-Brown field in a way that is useful to judges who encounter combined Title VII-tort cases involving federal employees. Given that the congressional intent of § 717 was to provide
a remedy for federal employees who suffered employment discrimination and that tort claims could be pursued against the
United States prior to the amendment via the FTCA, the doctrine of implied repeal counsels that tort claims filed against the
federal government should be presumptively valid because there
was no congressional intent to abrogate such a remedy. Nonetheless, the Court's holding in Brown requires that Title VII
provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination in federal employment, and torts that aim to remedy such discrimination and
nothing more must be distinguished. This Comment recommends that judges hearing such cases adjudicate the preclusive

209

See id.
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effect of § 717 by considering whether the tort in question is the

functional equivalent of an employment discrimination claim.

